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INTRODUCTION 
 
After several years of controversy and uncertainty, on 8 April 2010 the 
Bribery Act 2010 received the Royal Assent.
1
 The Act swept away the 
unsatisfactory, fragmented and complex corruption offences at common law 
and under the Prevention of Corruption Acts 1889-1916
2
 and in their place 
created two general corruption offences (the offence of bribing another person 
and the offence of being bribed, each of which may be committed in the 
public or private sector), a discrete offence of the bribery of a foreign public 
official and an entirely new offence of failure by a commercial organisation to 
prevent a bribe being paid.
3
  
Yet whilst an important milestone, the Bribery Act did not repeal the 
common law offence of misconduct in a public office
4
 nor, of course, did it 
impact on the tort of misfeasance in public office. For many years, these were 
both somewhat neglected avenues for dealing with corrupt public officials but 
recently they have found a new lease of life.
5
 The offence has become 
increasingly popular with prosecutors not only in England and Wales
6
 but in 
                                                   
 John Hatchard, LLB, LLM, Barrister, Professor of Law, University of Buckingham 
Law School. This is an expanded and updated article that is based on a chapter written 
for C Nicholls, T Daniel, A Bacarese and J Hatchard Corruption and Misuse of Public 
Office (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2nd edn, 2011) (hereafter „Nicholls‟). 
1 The Act came into force on 1 July 2011. 
2 It also repealed sections 108-110 Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 which 
extended the jurisdiction of UK courts to include the bribery of foreign public officials 
and corruption abroad by UK nationals and companies incorporated in the UK. 
3 See generally Nicholls, chapter 4.  
4 The offence is sometimes referred to as misfeasance in a public office. 
5 Indeed in Davis v Bromley Corporation [1908] 1 KB 170, the Court of Appeal held 
the tort of misfeasance did not exist.  
6 Statistics on the number of persons proceeded against in magistrates‟ courts in 
England and Wales between 1998 and 2007 can be found in a paper by L Maer 
“Misconduct in Public Office” (2009) House of Commons Library p 11. 
COMBATING CORRUPTION 
 66 
other jurisdictions such as Canada
7
 and Hong Kong.
8
 Its importance as a 
weapon through which to combat corrupt practices is also highlighted by the 
inclusion of an “abuse of functions” offence in the United Nations Convention 
Against Corruption (UNCAC).
9
 Furthermore, the tort of misfeasance in a 
public office “bears some resemblance to the crime of misconduct in a public 
office”10 and is now well established and is increasingly used in 
Commonwealth countries.
11
  
Several recent cases have explored and extended the scope of both the 
crime and the tort. This article explores these developments and, in particular, 
considers the contribution that both the crime and the tort can have in the fight 
against corruption and misuse of public office. In the first section, the offence 
of misconduct in a public office is considered whilst the second section 
explores the tort of misfeasance in a public office. The final section provides a 
short conclusion. 
 
SECTION 1: THE CRIMINAL OFFENCE OF MISCONDUCT IN 
PUBLIC OFFICE 
 
The offence of misconduct in public office is an ancient one. Pollock and 
Maitland trace it back to the 13
th
 century
12
 although the starting point for the 
development of the present offence essentially goes back over two hundred 
years to the judgment of Lord Mansfield CJ in R v Bembridge
13
 who identified 
two principles. Firstly that:  
 
“...a man accepting an office of trust, concerning the public, especially 
if attended with profit, is answerable criminally to the King for 
                                                   
7 See Article 122 of the Criminal Code of Canada (the offence of Breach of Trust by a 
Public Officer). See further the discussion in R v Boulanger [2006] 2 SCR 49 
(Supreme Court of Canada). 
8 Hong Kong has retained the common law offence: see Shum Kwok Shur v HKSAR 
[2002] 5 HKCFAR 381 (Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal). 
9 See Article 19 which is noted below. 
10 See Lord Steyn in Three Rivers District Council v Bank of England (No 3) [2003] 2 
AC 1 para 191. 
11 See the views of Lord Diplock in Dunlop v Woolahra Municipal Council [1982] AC 
158 at 172 and Brennan J in Northern Territory of Australia v Mengel (1995) 69 
ALJR 527. 
12 F Pollock and F Maitland The History of English Law (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2nd edn, 1898, Vol 2) pp 520-521, who trace the offence back to the 
13th century: see R v W [2010] EWCA Crim 372 para 1. 
13 (1783) 3 Doug 327; 99 ER 679. For earlier cases see Mackalley’s Case (1611) 9 Co 
Rep 656; Crouther’s Case (1600) Cro Eliz 654; 78 ER 893 and Anonymous (1704) 87 
ER 853. 
THE DENNING LAW JOURNAL 
 67 
misbehaviour in his office; this is true by whomever and in whatever 
way the officer is appointed.” 
 
Secondly, “where there is a breach of trust, fraud or imposition, in a 
matter concerning the public, though as between individuals it would only be 
actionable, yet as between the King and the subject it is indictable”.14 
Thus the offence is essentially a support for integrity and good 
governance on the basis that those who are entrusted with state power must 
act for the public good. Whilst many of the reported cases involve police 
officers, the offence applies generally to officials in the public service, local 
government
15
 and, arguably those in the private sector providing public 
functions.
16
 Its growing importance is due to several reasons. Firstly, it can be 
used to prosecute corrupt practices by public officials, for example where a 
public official awards a lucrative government contract to a company of which 
s/he is a secret beneficiary or arranges for the sale of government land to a 
company owned or controlled by his/her family at a price far below the 
market value.
17
 A charge of conspiracy to cause misconduct in public office is 
also available for use against those seeking to corrupt public officials.
18
 
Secondly a single charge of misconduct in a public office may reflect a 
course of conduct or address a situation where no financial reward is 
involved. For example, in Sin Kam Wah v HKSAR
19
 the accused, a senior 
police officer, was in command of a department responsible for investigating 
vice offences. He was convicted on three charges of misconduct in that on 
several occasions he had been provided with prostitutes by the owner of 
several night clubs in return for protection from police investigation. In R v 
McDade a former female prison officer pleaded guilty to the misconduct 
offence following her “inappropriate relationship with an inmate under her 
care”, which included a sexual relationship with him and the smuggling of 
items into the prison on his behalf.
20
 
Thirdly it can apply to a somewhat disparate range of acts and omissions 
where these go beyond the need for disciplinary action. Thus in the well-
                                                   
14 At page 681.  
15 Such as in R v Bowden above n 34. 
16 The scope of the term “public servant” is considered below. 
17 See, for example Marin & Coye v Attorney General of Belize [2011] CCJ 9 (AJ) 
which is discussed in detail below. 
18 For example, in July 2012 two journalists were arrested and charged with 
conspiracy to corrupt and conspiracy to cause misconduct in a public office. This was 
part of Operation Elveden, a police investigation into alleged corrupt payments by 
journalists to police officers to obtain information.  
19 [2005] 2 HKLRD 375. 
20 Unreported, CPS press release 13 November 2009. She was sentenced to 30 
months‟ imprisonment.  
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known case of R v Dytham
21
 a police officer was convicted of the misconduct 
offence when, whilst on duty and in uniform, he witnessed a fatal assault on a 
man by a number of assailants. The officer took no steps to intervene and, 
when it was over, merely drove away. Similarly, in R v Burrows
22
 the 
defendant who was a probationary police officer had been called to assist at a 
public order incident at which a fellow officer had assaulted a man before 
arresting him. In order to protect his fellow officer, the defendant wrote false 
notes of the incident and falsely claimed that he had arrested one of the men 
involved. He admitted the offence of misconduct in a public office. Again, in 
R v W
23
 a police officer was charged with the misconduct offence when he 
used a police credit card for his own personal expenditure as well as official 
expenses contrary to Force Instructions, albeit that the practice was widely 
followed by very large numbers of his colleagues.
24
  
The failure to protect vulnerable persons is another area where the offence 
is applicable. For example in R v Harrington, a police officer pleaded guilty 
to misconduct in a public office on the basis of committing sexual acts upon 
an alleged victim of a sexual assault to whom he had been appointed as 
chaperone. The case against him was put on the basis that he had a duty to 
ensure that the woman was treated with kindness and sympathy in order to 
obtain the best possible evidence from her to aid the investigation of the 
sexual assault in respect of which she was the victim.
25
  
Fourthly, given that the offence carries a maximum sentence of life 
imprisonment, it can be used in a variety of circumstances where other 
charges may not necessarily be applicable or appropriate or where the court‟s 
sentencing powers are otherwise inadequate. An important contemporary 
example is the unauthorised leaking of official information, an area in which 
the offence is proving particularly useful to prosecutors.
26
 Thus in R v Lund-
Lack,
27
 a civilian working for a police counter-terrorism unit was convicted of 
misconduct in public office when he leaked information to a journalist about a 
                                                   
21 [1979] QB 722. 
22 Unreported, Middlesex Guildhall Crown Court, 2005. 
23 [2010] EWCA Crim 372. 
24 His appeal against conviction was upheld due to the misdirection of the trial judge 
regarding the mens rea for the offence. 
25 Unreported, Central Criminal Court, 2003. The accused was sentenced to six 
months‟ imprisonment. 
26 Indeed paragraph 31 of the interpretative notes to UNCAC indicates that the Article 
19 “abuse of functions” offence may encompass a range of conduct such as improper 
disclosure by a public official of classified or privileged information: 
(A/58/422/Add.1, para. 31). 
27 Unreported, Kingston Crown Court, 2007. He was sentenced to eight months‟ 
imprisonment. 
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planned al-Qaeda attack. In R v Turner
28
 a police officer was convicted of the 
offence when over a period of about 18 months and on a large number of 
occasions, he accessed records held on police computers and passed this 
information on to criminals. In dismissing his appeal, Lord Judge emphasized 
that “At the risk of repetition, police officers who access records and 
computers kept by the police for police purposes must be deterred, and 
deterrent sentences will be passed”.29  
 
THE ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENCE  
 
The long line of cases that have explored the elements of the offence were 
considered by Pill LJ in the seminal case of Attorney-General’s Reference (No 
3 of 2003) (hereafter A-G Ref 2003).
30
 From these he concluded that the 
elements of the offence are: 
 
i)  A public officer acting as such; 
ii)  Wilfully neglects to perform his duty and/or wilfully misconducts 
himself; 
iii) To such a degree as to amount to abuse of the public‟s trust in the 
office holder; 
iv) Without reasonable excuse or justification.
31
 
 
It is useful to consider each element separately. 
 
i) A Public Office Holder 
 
Over the years, the scope of a “public office holder” has been extended. 
As noted earlier, in R v Bembridge Lord Mansfield CJ referred to a person 
“accepting an office of trust, concerning the public” whilst in R v Whitaker32 it 
was stated that a public officer “is an officer who discharges any duty in the 
discharge of which the public are interested, more clearly so if he is paid out 
of a fund provided by the public”.33 In R v Bowden34 the Court of Appeal 
concluded that the offence applies generally to every person who is appointed 
to discharge a public duty and is paid compensation in whatever form, 
whether from the Crown or otherwise. The key issue therefore is whether the 
                                                   
28 [2009] EWCA Crim 2219. 
29 At para 35. Turner was sentenced to twelve months‟ imprisonment. 
30 [2004] EWCA Crim 868. 
31 At para 61. 
32 [1914] 3 KB 1283. 
33 At page 1296. 
34
 [1996] 1 WLR 98; [1996] Cr App R 104. 
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public has an interest in the proper discharge of the duty placed upon the 
individual.
35
 The issue of remuneration is discussed below.  
Who then is classified as a “public official” for the purposes of the 
offence? Willes J in R v Lancaster and Worrell
36
 concluded that “the 
application and the principle is not confined to public servants in the narrow 
sense, under the direct orders of the Crown”. Thus seemingly it is not 
necessary that the individual in question is “appointed” to the post. This was 
certainly the view of the majority in the Australian case of R v Boston
37
 who 
held that the post of a Member of Parliament was a public office.
38
 The term 
also seemingly covers the significant number of public sector workers who 
are paid through private companies. As Pill LJ noted in A-G Ref 2003, “public 
functions are now frequently carried out by employees in private employment, 
for example those concerned with security at courts and the transport of 
defendants”.39 However the court declined to address the attractive 
submission of counsel that it is unfair and illogical if those holding a public 
office, such as police officers, are to be liable to a sanction not applicable to 
those in private employment who do similar work.  
A “flexible approach” to the issue is also illustrated in the recent case of R 
v Belton
40
 where Goss LJ in the Court of Appeal regarded a volunteer prison 
visitor with the Independent Monitoring Board as a public servant on the basis 
that: 
 
“It seems most improbable that a person would be given such an 
entitlement [i.e. to visit any place in the prison and to interview any 
prisoner] if not the holder of a public office, or otherwise, under some 
suitable contractual arrangement with the prison [my emphasis].”  
 
If this statement is correct, then this represents a potentially significant 
widening of the scope of the offence and makes identifying its limits even 
more challenging. In such circumstances, it is perhaps preferable to focus on 
                                                   
35 It was also noted that a “public office” was correctly defined in Henly v Lyme 
Corporation (1828) 5 Bing New Cases 91 where the case involved a mayor and 
burgesses of a borough. 
36 (1890) 16 Cox CC 739. 
37 (1923) 33 CLR 386. 
38 In R v Currie Unreported, Central Criminal Court, 1992, Buckley, J as trial judge, 
ruled that an MP was the holder of a public office for the purposes of the common law 
offence of bribery. In the Galley and Green case, discussed below, the issue was not 
raised in circumstances where a serving member of Parliament was investigated on 
suspicion of being an accessory to the misconduct offence.  
39 Para 62. 
40
 [2010] EWCA Crim 2857. 
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the nature and extent of the duty undertaken and thus adopt a functional rather 
than a titular approach to the issue.  
The issue of whether there is a requirement that the public servant was in 
receipt of any remuneration in order to establish the offence was also 
considered in R v Belton. The decision itself hinged upon the correctness of 
the pre-trial ruling that “there is no requirement in law that someone must be 
remunerated in order to be a public officer”. In the Court of Appeal, Gross LJ 
referred to the words of Lord Mansfield CJ in R v Bembridge noted earlier and 
also the view of AT Lawrence J in R v Whitaker
41
 that a “public office holder 
is an officer who discharges any duty in the discharge of which the public are 
interested, more clearly so if he is paid out of a fund provided by the public” 
(my emphasis). He also noted that in R v Borron
42
 an unpaid magistrate was 
also charged with the misconduct offence
43
 and that Pill LJ in Att-Gen Ref 
2003 when setting out the elements of the modern offence made no reference 
to the point. Accordingly, Gross LJ took the view that “remuneration is 
indicative but not determinative” of the issue and is thus not an indispensable 
requirement for the offence of misconduct in public office.
44
 
The effect of the judgment is to confirm that the offence also potentially 
applies to a range of unpaid individuals operating within the public sector 
“including magistrates, special constables, perhaps local councillors and high 
sheriffs”.45 In the case of volunteers “each case must turn on its own facts” 
and this inevitably raises uncertainty about those affected and in what 
circumstances. As was recognised in Belton, liability in each case will 
seemingly depend upon the scope of the volunteer‟s duties and powers.46  
 
ii) Wilfully Neglects to Perform a Duty and/or Wilful Misconduct 
 
It is useful to explore firstly the scope of the offence as this issue directly 
impacts on the mens rea requirement. The misconduct offence has always 
applied to corrupt practices. Thus in R v Bembridge, Lord Mansfield CJ 
emphasised the need to prove that the defendant acted “corruptly and 
fraudulently” whilst in R v Williams he referred to the need for a “corrupt 
motive”.47 None of the later cases have seemingly explored what constitutes 
                                                   
41 [1914] 3 KB 1283. 
42 (1820) 3 B & Ald 432. 
43 Although the charge was dismissed on other grounds. 
44 See para 30. 
45 Per Goss LJ at para 29. 
46 Gross LJ emphasised that “For the avoidance of any doubt it does not follow ... that 
every volunteer on every „quango‟ will hold public office” at para 17. 
47 See R v Bembridge (1783) 3 Doug 327; 99 ER 679, and R v Llewellyn-Jones [1968] 
1 QB 429. 
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“corruption” in this context whilst relevant international instruments are also 
largely silent on the point. For example, “corruption” is not defined in the 
United Nations Convention Against Corruption which merely requires State 
Parties to adopt (or in some cases to consider adopting) a series of, what 
might be termed “corruption and related offences” that include bribery, 
trading in influence and, in Article 19 an offence of “abuse of functions” in 
the following terms:  
 
“Each State Party shall consider adopting such legislative and other 
measures as may be necessary to establish as a criminal offence, when 
committed intentionally, the abuse of functions or position, that is, the 
performance of or failure to perform an act, in violation of laws, by a 
public official in the discharge of his or her functions, for the purpose 
of obtaining an undue advantage for himself or herself or for another 
person or entity”. 
 
The case of Magill v Weeks
48
 indicates that “corruption” goes beyond 
obtaining a financial advantage. In the House of Lords, Lord Bingham of 
Cornhill described the actions of certain local councillors in designating 
council houses for sale in the hope of electoral advantage as a “deliberate, 
blatant and dishonest misuse of public power. It was a misuse of power by 
both of them not for the purpose of financial gain but for that of electoral 
advantage. In that sense it was corrupt”.49 As Lord Scott of Foscote also 
emphasised: 
 
“This is a case about political corruption. The corruption was not 
money corruption. No one took a bribe. No one sought or received 
money for political favours. But there are other forms of corruption, 
often less easily detectable and therefore more insidious. 
Gerrymandering, the manipulation of constituency boundaries for 
party political advantage, is a clear form of political corruption. So, 
too, would be any misuse of municipal powers, intended for use in the 
general public interest but used instead for party political advantage. 
Who can doubt that the selective use of municipal powers in order to 
obtain party political advantage represents political corruption? 
Political corruption, if unchecked, engenders cynicism about elections, 
about politicians and their motives and damages the reputation of 
democratic government”.50 
 
                                                   
48 [2001] UKHL 67. 
49 At para 48. 
50
 At para 132.  
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Of course the offence goes beyond “corrupt” conduct and is said also to 
cover those “whose activities include extortion, fraud and oppression”.51 In R 
v Dytham
52
 it was said that the offence “is more vividly exhibited where 
dishonesty is revealed as part of the dereliction of duty”.53 In the important 
recent case of R v W
54
 the Court of Appeal recognised that the nature of the 
conduct falling within the ambit of the offence is very wide and noted that the 
Salmon Report had observed that the offence “embraces a wide variety of 
misconduct including acts done with a dishonest, oppressive or corrupt 
motive”.55 Further that “its principal applications are said to include: (a) 
frauds and deceits (fraud in office); (b) wilful neglect of duty (nonfeasance); 
(c) "malicious" exercises of official authority (misfeasance); (d) wilful 
excesses of official authority (malfeasance); and (e) the intentional infliction 
of bodily harm, imprisonment, or other injury upon a person (oppression)”.56 
What is clear is that there is a critical distinction between breaches of public 
duty emanating from a corrupt, fraudulent etc motive, which fall within the 
criminal offence, and mistakes or errors by public officials, however serious, 
which do not.
57
  
The majority of reported cases focus on allegations of misconduct by 
public officials. However, identifying the scope of the offence, and therefore 
the mens rea requirement, is complicated by the fact that there developed a 
separate line of cases dealing with public officials who neglected their official 
duties. Thus in the early case of R v Wyat
58
 it was said that where “... an 
officer neglects a duty incumbent on him, either by common law or statute, he 
is for his default indictable”.59 In fact Stephen in his Digest of the Criminal 
Law identified two separate offences, firstly “frauds and breaches of trust by 
officers” and secondly “neglect of official duty”.60 Thus in Dytham (noted 
earlier), whilst there was no corruption or dishonesty alleged, Lord Widgery 
CJ concluded the accused could be convicted of a wilful neglect of duty, with 
the element of culpability being “of such a degree that the misconduct 
impugned is calculated to injure the public interest so as to call for 
                                                   
51 R v Llewellyn-Jones [1968] 1 QB 429. Here a county court registrar exercised his 
judicial responsibility with the intention of gaining an improper personal advantage.  
52 [1979] QB 722. 
53 Per Lord Widgery CJ at 726.  
54 [2010] EWCA Crim 372. 
55 Report of the Royal Commission on Standards in Public Life 1974-76 (the Salmon 
Commission) Cmnd 5624.  
56 Referring to an article by P D Finn “Official Misconduct” [1978] 2 Crim LJ 308. 
57 A point made by Abbott CJ in R v Borron (1820) 3 B & Ald 432. 
58 (1705) 91 ER 331. 
59 At p 332. For example, the failure of officers to suppress a riot: see R v Kennett 
(1781) 172 ER 976. 
60
 Articles 121 and 122 respectively. 
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condemnation and punishment”.61 In fact, the cases have regularly combined 
the two offences, as the formulation in Att-Gen Ref 2003 indicates.
62
  
This flexibility as to the scope of the offence inevitably impacts upon the 
formulation of the mental element. In Att-Gen Ref 2003 Pill LJ emphasised 
that “the concept of wilful misconduct is apt to the offence” and referred to 
the “helpful” words of Webster J in Graham v Teesdale & Another63 who 
stated that wilful misconduct means: 
 
“...deliberately doing something which is wrong knowing it to be 
wrong or with reckless indifference as to whether it is wrong or not”. 
 
Pill LJ emphasised that there must be an awareness of the duty to act or a 
subjective recklessness as to the existence of the duty and added:
64
 
 
“The recklessness test will apply to the question whether, in particular 
circumstances, a duty arises at all as well as to the conduct of the 
defendant if it does. The subjective test applies both to reckless 
indifference to the legality of the act or omission and in relation to the 
consequences of the act or omission”. 
 
To address the mens rea requirement as regards the neglect of official 
duties, Pill LJ stated “even in the context of misconduct said to arise from 
failure to perform a police duty, it was necessary for the Crown to establish 
some mental element”.65 The result is that what constitutes the appropriate 
mens rea will vary depending upon the particular circumstances of a case. 
This was accepted by the Court of Appeal in R v W where Lord Judge put it as 
follows:  
 
“…as the nature of the conduct falling within the ambit of the offence 
is very wide, any necessary element relating to the defendant‟s 
                                                   
61 At page 394. 
62 This approach is also reflected in the views of Sir Anthony Mason NPJ in Shum 
Kwok Sher v HKSAR [2002] HKCFA 27, where he stated: “A public official culpably 
misconducts himself if he wilfully and intentionally neglects or fails to perform a duty 
to which he is subject by virtue of his office or employment without reasonable excuse 
or justification. A public official also culpably misconducts himself if, with an 
improper motive, he wilfully and intentionally exercises a power or discretion which 
he has by virtue of his office or employment without reasonable excuse or 
justification” at para 84. See also Article 19 of UNCAC, noted earlier. 
63 (1981) 81 LGR 117. 
64 Applying the House of Lords decision in R v G [2003] UKHL 50.  
65 As Lord Judge put it in R v W [2010] EWCA Crim 372 at para 5 after having 
referred to the views of Pill LJ. 
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subjective state of mind cannot be identical for each and every one of 
its different manifestations”.66 
 
This situation is hardly conducive to seeking certainty in the formulation 
of criminal offences and arguably any reform of the current position should 
consider the development of two separate offences.  
 
iii) To Such a Degree as to Amount to Abuse of the Public’s Trust 
in the Office Holder 
 
For prosecutors and jurors alike, distinguishing between misconduct, 
mistakes or conflicts of interest by public officials that are merely disciplinary 
in nature and those which attract criminal liability is potentially problematic.
67
 
The courts have emphasised that the test of culpability is that of “serious 
misconduct” and “must be of such a degree that the misconduct impugned is 
calculated to injure the public interest so as to call for condemnation and 
punishment”.68 As Pill LJ put it “The threshold is a high one requiring 
conduct so far below acceptable standards as to amount to an abuse of the 
public‟s trust in the office holder. A mistake, even a serious one, will not 
suffice”.69 Allegations of corruption or bribery are certainly covered but in 
other cases the relevant factors to be taken into account are (i) the 
responsibilities of the office and office holder, (ii) the importance of the 
public objects which they serve; and (iii) the nature and extent of the 
departure from those responsibilities.
70
  
The issue as to the seriousness of the consequences of the breach in 
determining criminal liability remains uncertain. In Att-Gen Ref 2003, Pill LJ 
noted that:  
 
“An act or omission which may have as its consequence a death, 
viewed in terms of the need for maintenance of public standards to be 
marked and the public interest to be asserted, is likely to be more 
                                                   
66 Above, at para 8. 
67 The facts of R v W provide a good example of the sometimes difficult line to be 
drawn between the two.  
68 Per Lord Widgery CJ in Dytham, above n 21, at 727-8. The Supreme Court of 
Canada has stated that the conduct of the public officer must represent a “marked 
departure” from the standards expected of an individual in the accused‟s position: see 
R v Boulanger [2006] 2 SCR 49 at para 54. 
69 At para 56. This is further emphasised in the Crown Prosecution Guidance which 
states that “A charge of misconduct in public office should be reserved for cases of 
serious misconduct or deliberate failure to perform a duty which is likely to injure the 
public interest”: see http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/l_to_o/misconduct_in_public_office/ 
70
 See the views Sir Anthony Mason NPJ in Shum Kwok Sher, above n 62, at para 86. 
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serious than one which would cause a trivial injury. This factor is 
likely to have less significance where, as in Shum Kwok Sher, the 
allegation is of corruption where the judgment upon the conduct may 
not vary directly in proportion to the amount of money involved”.71 
 
The potential difficulty with this approach is that it suggests that in some 
cases (such as those involving allegations of “corruption”) misconduct in a 
public office is a conduct crime and that the consequences of the act or 
omission are merely a factor to take into account when considering its 
culpability or seriousness. In other situations, it seems that the consequences 
of the action/omission as well as the motive with which the public officer 
acted are the key factors in determining whether the public‟s trust was abused 
to such an extent as to attract criminal liability.  
The point is well illustrated in the case of the unauthorised leaking of 
confidential information by a public servant. Arguably this, in itself, is a 
matter for the criminal law even where there was little or no resultant harm. 
As Judge LJ emphasised in Attorney-General Reference (No 140 of 2004):
72
  
 
“The unauthorised disclosure of information held in any records kept 
and maintained only for public purposes should always be regarded as 
a serious offence. The amount of private information about each and 
every single citizen in this country, available to public servants, has 
increased, and with modern technology continuing increase is 
virtually inevitable. Citizens are entitled to assume that the 
information so kept will only be made available to those who are 
entitled to see it, and only for the express purposes permitted by 
law”.73 
 
Yet the high-profile case of Green and Galley highlights the uncertainty 
surrounding this point. Here Galley, a civil servant, had allegedly leaked 
confidential government documents to Green, a (then) opposition member of 
Parliament. The action was contrary to the Civil Service Code (and therefore a 
disciplinary matter) but the issue was whether there were grounds to prosecute 
both men for the misconduct offence. In April 2009, the Director of Public 
Prosecutions (DPP) announced that he had concluded that there was no 
realistic prospect of a conviction against either of the men for the alleged 
                                                   
71 At para 46. 
72 [2004] EWCA Crim 3525. 
73
 Para 9. 
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offences and had decided that charges should not be brought. The reasons for 
this decision are noteworthy.
74
 In the first place, the DPP stated: 
 
“I have concluded that there is evidence upon which a jury might 
conclude that the conduct of Mr Galley in passing various documents 
to Mr Green amounted to a clear breach of his public duties.... Mr 
Galley seriously breached the trust placed in him by the public.... I 
have also concluded that there is evidence upon which a jury might 
conclude that Mr Green aided or abetted Mr Galley‟s conduct and, in 
particular, his breach of the public‟s trust. There is, additionally, 
evidence upon which a jury might conclude that there was an on-
going relationship between Mr Galley and Mr Green, which Mr Green 
encouraged in the hope and expectation that Mr Galley would 
continue to supply restricted and/or confidential information to him” 
(my emphasis).”  
 
However, the DPP then asserted: 
 
“It is important that public officials should not leak restricted and/or 
confidential information. But, it is important that a breach of duty that 
might best be considered as a disciplinary matter should not be 
elevated to a criminal offence simply by virtue of the fact that the 
person leaking the information is a public official. Thus there is a need 
for an intense focus on any additional damage actually or potentially 
caused. In this case, I have concluded that there is little evidence of 
any additional damage caused by the leaks in question. The 
documents leaked undoubtedly touched on matters of legitimate 
public interest and Mr Green‟s purpose in using the documents was 
apparently to hold the government to account…”. 
 
This is a curious approach in that the DPP had already recognised that 
“Mr Galley seriously breached the trust placed in him by the public” by the 
unauthorised leaking of confidential information. Arguably, the fact that there 
was “little evidence of any additional damage caused by the leaks” was not a 
relevant consideration when determining whether the action itself constituted 
an abuse of the public‟s trust in the office holder and thus the threshold for a 
criminal prosecution had already been met by the action of Galley in passing 
confidential documents to Green. Whatever the motives for the decision of the 
DPP, it once again highlights the uncertainty as to the scope of the present 
law. This is reflected in the judgment of Pill LJ in Att Gen Ref 2003 who 
                                                   
74 “Decision on prosecution: Mr Christopher Galley and Mr Damien Green MP” CPS 
16 April 2009: available at www.cps.gov.uk. 
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stated that “It will normally be necessary to consider the likely consequences 
of the breach in deciding whether the conduct falls so far below the standard 
of conduct to be expected of the officer as to constitute the offence” (my 
emphasis). He continued: 
 
“There will be some conduct which possesses the criminal quality 
even if serious consequences are unlikely but it is always necessary to 
assess the conduct in the circumstances in which it occurs”.75 
 
Arguably, in cases of neglect of official duties the issue of consequences 
does not arise. An adjustment to the facts of Dytham illustrates the point. 
Suppose a police officer, whilst on duty and in uniform, witnesses an assault 
on a man. The officer takes no steps to intervene and, when the attack is over, 
merely drives away. However, unlike the situation in Dytham itself, the victim 
is only slightly injured in the attack. Assuming the requisite mens rea is 
present, it is the failure of the officer to respond appropriately that brings 
about liability for the misconduct offence and the consequences i.e. the extent 
of the injuries sustained by the victim, are irrelevant to the question of 
criminal liability. Again this illustrates the desirability of establishing two 
separate offences.   
 
iv) Without Justification or Excuse 
 
Pill LJ in Att-Gen Ref 2003 did not elaborate on this requirement but 
presumably this will be a matter for the court to take into consideration on a 
case by case basis. 
 
TOO “FLEXIBLE A FRIEND”? 
 
Recent developments regarding the misconduct office means that it a 
potentially useful “safety net” offence for prosecutors, especially as it remains 
an indictable only offence carrying a maximum sentence of life 
imprisonment.
76
 In 1996, Smith commented that “The most unsatisfactory 
feature of common law misdemeanours is the uncertainty about their elements 
                                                   
75 At para 58. 
76 In R v Rimmington, R v Goldstein [2005] UKHL63 the House of Lords emphasised 
that: “good practice and respect for the primacy of statute require that conduct falling 
within the terms of a specific statutory provision should be prosecuted under that 
provision unless there is good reason for doing otherwise” (at para 3). Not 
infrequently, the misconduct offence is included as an alternative to a statutory 
offence. 
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and limits and the boundaries between them”.77 The series of cases since then 
certainly reinforce this view and highlight the “flexible” and somewhat 
uncertain nature and scope of an offence that covers serious cases involving 
corruption to cases which arguably are little more than serious disciplinary 
matters. The uncertainty surrounding its scope might yet attract the interest of 
the European Court of Human Rights.  
The longevity of the offence is remarkable, especially in view of the 
numerous calls for the creation of a statutory offence. Yet its end may now be 
in sight for the Law Commission has announced that it will commence work 
in 2014 on a project that will involve the “simplification, clarification and 
codification of the common law offence” with a view to producing a final 
report in 2016. Hopefully this will address the problems and uncertainties 
explored in this part of the article.  
 
SECTION 2: THE TORT OF MISFEASANCE IN A PUBLIC 
OFFICE 
 
Like its criminal counterpart, the tort of misfeasance in a public office has 
a long history dating back at least to the case of Ashby v White.
78
 The raison 
d‟être of the tort is to address “bad faith in the exercise of public powers”79 
and thus to allow actions by a private individual or class of persons seeking 
recompense against public officers who have acted corruptly or otherwise 
seriously abused their powers: something which was not open to them through 
a public law suit. In other words, “misfeasance was created to offer the citizen 
in such a situation a head of liability under which to recover compensation”.80 
For example, where a voter was wilfully denied the right to vote by the 
returning officer;
81
 where a police officer forged the plaintiff‟s signature on a 
written statement withdrawing a complaint of theft,
82
 where a public official 
exercised his discretion to revoke a trader‟s licence for an improper purpose83 
or where a public official awarded a government contract to a company 
knowing that he had no power to do so lawfully and that in doing so the 
plaintiff would be injured.
84
 
                                                   
77 J Smith Case Comment “Misconduct in Public Office” [1996] Crim LR 57.  
78 1 Smith‟s LC (13th ed) 253; (1703) 92 ER 126. 
79 Lord Steyn in Three Rivers at page 193B. 
80 Marin & Coye (below) para 11. 
81 Ashby v White above n 78. 
82 Kuddus v Chief Constable of Leicestershire [2001] UKHL 29. 
83 Roncarelli v Duplessis [1959] SCR 121 (Supreme Court of Canada). 
84 Harmon CFEM Facades (UK) Ltd v The Corporate Officer of the House of 
Commons [1999] EWHC Technology 199.  
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As with its criminal counterpart, there was some uncertainty as to the 
scope of the tort. Indeed at one stage, the Court of Appeal effectively denied 
its existence.
85
 In 2003 the House of Lords in Three Rivers District Council v 
Bank of England (No 3),
86
 (Three Rivers), clarified and significantly expanded 
the scope of the tort. The decision of the Caribbean Court of Justice in the 
recent case of Marin and Coye v Attorney General of Belize
87
 suggests that 
there is yet further scope to develop the tort.
 
 
The Three Rivers case itself concerned a claim that the Bank of England 
was liable to former depositors with the Bank of Credit and Commerce 
International (BCCI) for the tort of misfeasance in public office on the basis 
of the Bank of England‟s failure in its responsibilities in supervising banking 
activities in the United Kingdom. Whilst the claim was not upheld, Lord 
Steyn in the House of Lords took the opportunity to identify the ingredients of 
the tort as follows.
88
  
 
1. The defendant must be a public officer; 
2. The defendant, at material times, was exercising power as a public officer; 
3. There are two different forms of liability: firstly, targeted malice by the 
defendant i.e. conduct specifically intended to injure a person(s) through 
the exercise of public power for an improper or ulterior motive; or 
secondly, where the defendant acted knowing that s/he had no power to 
do the act complained of and that the act would probably injure the 
plaintiff; 
4. The plaintiff has sufficient interest or nexus to bring an action; 
5. There is proof that the loss was caused by the abuse of power 
6. The damage was not too remote. 
 
Lord Steyn also recognised that “the tort bears some resemblance to the 
crime of misconduct in a public office”.89 This means that much of the 
discussion in Section 1 of this article on the elements of criminal misconduct 
is also applicable to the tort.
90
 However Pill LJ noted that there must be some 
differences between the two, for example in that “the crime is committed 
upon an affront to the Crown, that is in this context the public interest, 
whereas the tort requires a balancing of interests as between public officers 
                                                   
85 Davis v Bromley Corporation [1908] 1 KB 170. 
86 [2003] 2 AC 1. 
87 [2011] CCJ9 (AJ). 
88 [2003] 2 AC 1, pp 191–194. 
89 At page 191A, citing R v Bowden above n 34. 
90 For example, the principles laid down in R v Bembridge are reflected in the civil 
case of Henly v Lyme Corporation 5 Bing 91. 
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and individual members of the public or organisations seeking private 
remedies having asserted a loss which must be proved”.91 
The particular significance of the Three Rivers decision was that it 
expanded the scope of the tort of misfeasance. As Chamberlain has argued, 
historically, the tort was limited to abuses of power that were directly targeted 
against a particular plaintiff, the essence being the misuse of power by a 
public officer with the deliberate intent to harm that person.
92
 However, she 
points out that under the test laid down in Three Rivers “it is only necessary to 
establish that the defendants were reckless as to whether their actions were 
lawful and reckless as to the fact that harm to the plaintiffs would likely 
ensue” and suggests that such an approach “cannot possibly keep the 
misfeasance tort within reasonable bounds”.93 The decision of the Caribbean 
Court of Justice in Marin v Coye seeks to develop the tort still further.  
 
Further Developing the Tort? The Case of Marin & Coye v Attorney General 
of Belize 
 
In Three Rivers, Lord Steyn stated that one of the essential elements of the 
tort is that “any plaintiff must have a sufficient interest to found a legal 
standing to sue. Subject to this qualification, principle does not require the 
introduction of proximity as a controlling mechanism in this corner of the 
law.... There is no reason why such an action cannot be brought by a 
particular class of persons, such as depositors at a bank, even if their precise 
identities were not known to the bank”.94 This class will also include claims 
brought by corporate and other entities.
95
 
It is in this context that the 2011 decision of the Caribbean Court of 
Justice (CCJ) in Marin and Coye v Attorney General of Belize (hereafter 
Marin & Coye) is of particular interest.
96
 The facts were straightforward. The 
                                                   
91 Para 48. He added “[neither] the mental element associated with the misconduct, 
nor the threshold of misconduct should be set lower for the crime than for the tort” (at 
para 53). However, compare this view with the discussion in Marin and Coye below. 
92 See E Chamberlain “The Need for a „Standing‟ Rule in Misfeasance in a Public 
Office” [2007] Oxford University Commonwealth Law Journal 215. 
93 At p 235. 
94 At p 193. Lord Steyn also expressly agreed with the view of the trial judge that “If 
an officer deliberately does an act which he knows is unlawful and will cause 
economic loss to the plaintiff, I can see no reason in principle why the plaintiff should 
identify a legal right which is being infringed or a particular duty owed to him, beyond 
the right not to be damaged or injured by a deliberate abuse of power by a public 
officer”. 
95 See, for example, Bourgoin SA v Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food 
[1985] 3 WLR 1027.  
96 
[2011] CCJ 9 (AJ) 
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Attorney General of Belize filed a civil claim against two former government 
ministers alleging that during their tenure in office they had procured the sale 
of state land to a company beneficially owned and/or controlled by one of 
them at almost $1 million below market value.
97
 Crucially, the claim was 
based on the common law tort of misfeasance in public office. The central 
question for the CCJ was whether the tort encompassed actions by the 
Attorney General, acting on behalf of the State, against its own officers, or 
former officers. By a majority of 3-2, the CCJ held that the Attorney General 
was competent to bring the action on behalf of the Crown against the 
appellants in order to recover compensation for the loss sustained.
98
  
As noted below, all the judges of the CCJ recognised that some civil 
causes of action and remedies were already open to the State through which to 
combat corruption and misuse of public office. The essential disagreement 
focused on the view of the majority that the tort of misfeasance offered an 
extra tool for the State to fight corruption to be used not instead of but in 
addition to other available tools and that would serve to promote rather than 
erode integrity in public life. The two dissenting judges, de la Bastide PCCJ 
and Saunders JCCJ, took the view that “as a matter of policy” the court should 
not extend the tort to accommodate actions by the State and that “there can be 
little doubt that the appropriate course of action here is for the State to 
institute criminal proceedings”. Further, they found it “impossible to 
conceive” a situation where corrupt acts occasioning serious material loss to 
the State would suffice to ground an action in tortious misfeasance but be 
insufficient to make out a prima facie criminal case. They concluded that:  
 
“Extending the tort of misfeasance unnecessarily to give the Attorney-
General another choice of civil remedies does not strike a blow for the 
maintenance of probity by public officials. Quite the contrary, it has 
the opposite effect. It offers the miscreant the softer option of civil 
liability” (my emphasis).99 
 
These views raise two key issues for consideration: (i) the use of the tort 
as an alternative to, or in addition, to the criminal offence of misconduct in 
public office; and (ii) whether, in any event, the tort accommodates actions 
brought on behalf of the State. 
 
                                                   
97 The Government of Belize was claiming $924,056.60, plus damages and interest, 
for the sale of 59 parcels of land in Coye‟s former constituency. 
98 It is not clear as to why the Director of Public Prosecutions did not bring a criminal 
prosecution for misconduct in public office, where the alleged facts certainly indicated 
that the former ministers had a case to answer.  
99
 Para 44. 
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(i) The Tort of Misfeasance as an Alternative, or in Addition, to the Criminal 
Offence of Misconduct in Public Office  
 
As in the Marin & Coye case itself, allegations of corrupt practices or 
abuse of power against public officials will always raise the prospect of a 
criminal prosecution for misconduct in public office (or some other offence) 
and this point was accepted by all members of the CCJ. However, that is not 
to overlook the sometimes sound policy reasons for considering the use of the 
tort of misfeasance as an alternative, or in addition, to criminal proceedings 
and there is nothing in law to prevent the two sets of proceedings from 
running side-by-side.
100
  
In the first place, the dissenting judges argued that in misfeasance cases, 
the courts were entitled to require a higher standard of probability than in a 
negligence claim. This is questionable. This view was based on the views of 
Denning LJ in Bater v Bater
101
 that “where criminal acts are being established 
in a civil case, courts are entitled to require a higher degree of probability than 
that which they would seek when considering whether negligence, for 
example, were established.” This implies that there is little to differentiate 
between the standard of proof in criminal and “serious” civil cases, and as the 
dissenting judges acknowledged, this may explain why the “rate of success” 
for misfeasance suits was “notoriously low”.102 Whilst they adopted a 
comparative analysis of many issues, strangely they made no reference to the 
2008 House of Lords decision of In re Doherty
103
 where Lord Carswell 
adopted a forthright approach to the standard of proof: 
 
23. Much judicial time has been spent in the last 50 or 60 years in 
attempts to explain what is required by way of proof of facts for a 
court or tribunal to reach the proper conclusion. It is indisputable that 
only two standards are recognised by the common law, proof on the 
balance of probabilities and proof beyond reasonable doubt. The latter 
standard is that required by the criminal law and in such areas of 
dispute as contempt of court or disciplinary proceedings brought 
against members of a profession. The former is the general standard 
applicable to all other civil proceedings and means simply, as Lord 
Nicholls of Birkenhead said in In re H (Minors) (Sexual Abuse: 
Standard of Proof) [1996] AC 563, 586, that  
 
                                                   
100 See, for example, Connelly v DPP [1964] AC 1245 and R v L [2006] 1 WLR 3092. 
101 [1950] 2 All ER 458 at 459. 
102 Para 35. 
103
 [2008] 1 WLR 1499. 
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"a court is satisfied an event occurred if the court considers that, on 
the evidence, the occurrence of the event was more likely than not." 
 
24. Any confusion which has crept into the application of this 
principle appears to have stemmed from statements made in a number 
of earlier cases, which may have been misunderstood but certainly 
have not always been applied correctly. The earliest situation appears 
to be Bater v Bater [1951] P 35, 37.... 
 
There is much to commend this approach and, if adopted elsewhere, then, 
contrary to the view of the dissenting judges, there is indeed a clear and 
significant distinction between the standard of proof in criminal and civil 
cases even where this involves an allegation of criminal conduct.
104
 
Secondly, there remain significant challenges in successfully prosecuting 
corruption or misconduct cases, including working with the outdated and 
excessively technical rules of evidence that are still found in many 
Commonwealth countries. Other challenges, particularly associated with 
senior public officers and political figures, include the absconding of the 
official, constitutional immunity from prosecution, judicial corruption or the 
lack of the political will to prosecute.
105
 
Thirdly, the view of the dissenting judges that the tort of misfeasance 
offers a “softer option” is also questionable. They certainly make the useful 
point that “the yardstick for measuring the appropriateness of suitable 
proceedings by the State against those who are involved in corrupt acts ought 
not, in our view, to be relegated merely to the degree to which the State‟s loss 
was recoverable through those proceedings”. They also note that courts often 
impose massive fines on persons convicted of misfeasance in public office,
106
 
albeit overlooking the fact that fines and criminal confiscation orders are 
dependent upon a criminal conviction. Yet as Maurice Kaye LJ emphasised in 
Hussain v Chief Constable of West Mercia:  
 
“Misfeasance in public office is an intentional tort of considerable 
gravity. It is a tort of obloquy. As Lord Steyn explained in Three 
Rivers DC v Bank of England (No.3), it involves either targeted malice 
or bad faith on the part of a public official”.107  
 
                                                   
104 One of the majority judges, Anderson JCCJ, certainly recognised that the standard 
of proof differed significantly between tort and criminal proceedings: see para 147.  
105 See generally Nicholls, especially chapter 8.  
106 Para 39. 
107
 [2008] EWCA Civ 1205 at para 20. 
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It is also clear that exemplary damages may be claimed.
108
  
It is against this background that the views of the majority in Marin & 
Coye must be considered. In his judgment, Wit JCCJ focused on the need for 
governments to take firm action against public officials who had abused their 
office for personal enrichment with a view to the State recovering the stolen 
assets. He asserted that “if the objective is to recover economic loss due to the 
public officer‟s abuse of his power, the tort of misfeasance would be the 
appropriate remedy”.109 This was echoed by Barnard JCCJ who noted that the 
option of a criminal prosecution was not within the remit of the Attorney 
General but that in any event “the Attorney General may be more concerned 
with recovering loss to the public purse which in this case is the economic 
value of the national lands amounting to $924,056.00”.110 Wit JCCJ also 
emphasised that “the criminal law should not be used by the State with the 
main objective of getting compensation for damages suffered by the State 
even though it is clear that such a result could be obtained through the 
backdoor of high fines or, where the legislation allows it, through the side 
door of compensation orders”.111  
This approach reflects the fact that the use of civil actions and remedies is 
now a key strategy for States seeking to recover stolen state assets. As Sir 
Dennis Byron has observed “It is now realised that one of the key factors in 
reducing crime, is the delivery of civil justice where it was previously thought 
it was the use of criminal sanctions”.112 There are already many examples of 
civil actions being brought by the State against corrupt public officials.
113
 
Perhaps the classic example is the civil action brought by the Attorney-
General of Zambia in the High Court of England and Wales in which Peter 
Smith J found that the former President of Zambia, Frederick Chiluba, 
together with former Zambian ministers and public officials had conspired 
fraudulently to misappropriated millions of dollars belonging to the people of 
Zambia through a number of corrupt schemes.
114
 Interestingly, this led to a 
criminal prosecution of Chiluba taking place in Zambia, although in 
somewhat contentious circumstances, he was exonerated on all charges.
115
  
                                                   
108 Kuddus v Chief Constable of Leicestershire [2001] UKHL 29.  
109 Para 95. 
110 Para 64. 
111 Para 96. Emphasis in the original. 
112 Address at the Opening of the 2nd Biennial Conference of Judicial Officers of the 
Caribbean Court of Justice, 2011.  
113 For example the notorious case of A-G for Hong Kong v Reid [1994] 1 AC 324 
(PC). See generally Nicholls chapters 8 and 9. 
114 See Attorney-General for Zambia v Meer Care and Desai [2007] EWHC 952 (Ch). 
115 
For a discussion see Nicholls para 9.29 et seq. 
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Thus, it is erroneous to view serious misconduct by public officials, such 
as in Marin & Coye, as inevitably requiring a criminal prosecution. Rather 
States have a choice between launching a criminal prosecution and a civil 
action (or utilising both) and this will depend upon the factors discussed 
above. It means that the key issue in Marin & Coye was whether it was 
appropriate to extend the tort of misfeasance to actions by the State. 
 
(ii) Does the Tort of Misfeasance Extend to Actions by the State Against 
Public Officials?  
 
In their dissenting judgment, de la Bastide PCCJ and Saunders JCCJ 
emphasised that “the overwhelming consensus throughout the entire 
Commonwealth ... is that the tort protects the peculiar interests of a private 
entity or member of a class”.116 Further that the “essentially private character 
of the tort” can be traced back to its roots which was to provide aggrieved 
individuals with the power to obtain recompense against public officials who 
had abused their powers: something which was not open to them through a 
public law suit. In other words, “Misfeasance was created to offer the citizen 
in such a situation a head of liability under which to recover 
compensation”.117 They also noted that this reflected the position from the 
early case of Henly v Lyme Corporation through to the House of Lords 
decision in Three Rivers as well as in jurisprudence from New Zealand,
118
 
Australia
119
 and Canada.
120
  
Curiously, and somewhat at odds with their views on the use of the 
criminal law in such cases, they also recognised that where the State has 
suffered loss in such circumstances, it already had effective alternative means 
to deal with the situation by bringing a civil suit against public officials for 
breach of fiduciary duty or breach of trust. As they emphasised: “The 
equitable causes of action are actually tailor-made for a case like this where 
Ministers of Government are alleged to have flouted their solemn 
responsibilities”.121  
The majority based their views on the need for courts to enjoy a wide 
array of options through which to combat corruption and misuse of public 
office and that different torts offered different remedies. Wit JCCJ rejected the 
argument that as there was no prior judicial authority for doing so, extending 
                                                   
116 Para 10. 
117 Para 11. 
118 Garrett v Attorney General [1997] 2 NZLR 332. 
119 Tampion v Anderson [1973] VR 715. 
120 Odhavji Estate v Woodhouse [2003] 3 SC 263. 
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the tort to an action by the State was not maintainable
122
 and he pointed out 
that in all the cases cited by the dissenting judges the point had simply not 
been in issue. In any event, he asserted, somewhat unconvincingly perhaps, 
that extending the tort “is in no way creating a new principle but is simply the 
logical application of the principles which have already been developed by the 
common law...”.123  
Anderson JCCJ was of the view that the State possessed the entitlement to 
sue in order to protect its rights and that “in contemporary society, in 
proceedings by and against the Crown, the rights of parties are to be as nearly 
as possible the same as in a suit between individual persons”.124 He also 
pointed out that the availability of alternative causes of action “cannot be 
logically determinative” of the competence of the Attorney General to sue in 
misfeasance. Essentially the matter fell to the consideration of the remedy 
sought. Thus where the State desired to trace property purchased by a public 
official, an action for breach of fiduciary duty might be more useful.
125
 
However the tort of misfeasance was appropriate where the Attorney General 
thought that an award of exemplary damages was appropriate and that the 
decision as to the type of civil proceedings to bring “to vindicate the State‟s 
corporate interests” should be left in the hands of the Attorney-General.126  
 
PART 3: SOME FINAL THOUGHTS 
 
The longevity of both the crime of misconduct and tort of misfeasance is 
remarkable and both are enjoying a new importance not only in England and 
Wales but also in a number of other jurisdictions. A key reason for this lies in 
the recognition that they both contribute to the development of a range of 
effective strategies through which states can seek to combat corrupt practices 
by their public officials  
The use of the criminal law is a fundamental part of this approach and, as 
regards England and Wales, the coming into force of the Bribery Act 2010 is 
an important step forward. However, as noted earlier, the Act is of limited 
scope. Thus the criminal offence of misconduct in a public office will remain 
an important weapon in the prosecutorial armoury, albeit that the continued 
uncertainty about its elements and limits discussed in this article certainly 
                                                   
122 At paras 89-90. He noted that in Southern Developers Ltd and Others v Attorney-
General of Antigua and Barbuda (unreported 2007) that it was assumed but not 
decided that a State could bring the action see para 89. 
123 At para 93. Barnard JCCJ refers to the court introducing a “new dimension” to the 
tort: at para 66. 
124 At para 137. 
125 See, for example the Reid case above n 113. 
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merit attention. Here the proposed Law Commission project that will involve 
the “simplification, clarification and codification” of the common law offence 
will hopefully address these concerns.   
Even with the statutory reform of the offence, for the reasons noted 
earlier, the criminal law has sometimes proved somewhat ineffective when 
seeking to combat corruption and serious misconduct by public officers. As a 
result, alternatives to criminal proceedings are becoming increasingly 
important prosecutorial tools, for example the use of formal plea 
negotiations.
127
 Yet the decision in Marin and Coye emphasises the increasing 
importance of utilising civil suits and remedies in the fight to enhance 
integrity in the public service and combat corrupt practices by public officials. 
Here the objective is to take away the profit from the abuse of office and 
enable the State and its people to recover its economic loss. Seen from this 
perspective, the decision of the Caribbean Court of Justice is noteworthy for, 
as Wit JCCJ stated, the decision offers an extra tool for the State to fight 
corruption to be used not instead of but in addition to other available tools and 
that will serve to promote rather than erode integrity in public life. As he put 
it, “At the end of the day the State has, as it should have, all the tools it needs 
to govern “for the common good of the people”128  
In seeking to introduce a “new dimension” to the tort of misfeasance, the 
court in Marin & Coye has suggested that it is “still developing” and that the 
Three Rivers decision is not the last word on the matter.
129
 It remains to be 
seen whether other States follow the lead of the Caribbean Court of Justice. 
What is clear is that courts worldwide are now exploring ways of extending 
and developing civil actions and remedies as a means to combat corruption in 
public office. As Anderson JCCJ put is so eloquently: 
 
“... these developments may well portend the welcome emergence of a 
new matrix of causes of action hitherto frozen in time in their 
historical crypts and animated by judicial imprimatur”.130 
                                                   
127 See, in particular, the Attorney-General’s Guidelines on Plea Discussions on Cases 
of Serious or Complex Fraud (2009). 
128 At para 148. 
129 See Wit JCCJ at para 75. 
130
 At para 152. 
